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Abstract
In this paper we consider mixed oligopoly markets for di®erentiated
goods where private and public ¯rms compete either in prices or quan-
tities. We then study the welfare e®ect of privatization interpreted as
partial strategic delegation of the public ¯rm to a private manager with
pro¯t concern. Itis shown that partial privatization improves welfare with
quantity competition when goods are substitutes, and with price compe-
tition when goods are complements. However full privatization (complete
delegation to private manager) can never be optimal. It is also shown that
the public ¯rm can make more pro¯t than the private ¯rm in equilibrium,
and that this possibility is more likely under quantity competition. Turn-
ing to market regulation policy, we ¯nd: (i) that public and private ¯rms
should be taxed the same; and (ii) that price regulation is better than
quantity regulation.
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11 Introduction
The literature on mixed oligopoly assumes the competition between private
¯rms and public ¯rms. Private ¯rms maximize pro¯ts and public ¯rms maxi-
mize welfare. The key issue is the welfare e®ect of privatization. De Fraja and
Delbono (1989) consider n private ¯rms competing with one public ¯rm pro-
ducing homogenous goods with the same technology involving a ¯xed cost and
increasing marginal costs (and no capacity constraint). Under Cournot{Nash
competition and provided that the market is su±ciently competitive (n exceeds
some threshold), they show that welfare is improved if the public ¯rm maximizes
pro¯t instead of welfare. This is a strong argument for privatization when mar-
kets are su±ciently competitive. Cremer et al. (1989) allow for the possibility
that cost is higher in public ¯rms (with constant marginal costs and identical
¯xed costs). Starting from a market where all ¯rms are private, they study the
welfare e®ect of transferring ¯rms into public ownership (i.e. nationalization)
instructing them to maximize welfare subject to break even condition. In the
short run the ¯xed cost is sunk and private ¯rms would stay active even if they
make negative pro¯ts in equilibrium, but in the long run such ¯rms would exit
the market. They show that in the short run it is optimal to have only one
public ¯rm (irrespective of the ¯xed cost) if the extra cost from public ¯rm
production is not too high. In the long run, nationalization of one ¯rm drives
out the remaining ¯rms and leads to a public monopoly, which is dominated by
a private monopoly due to the cost di®erence.
Our purpose in this paper is to extend the analysis of privatization and
taxation of mixed oligopoly in two important directions. The ¯rst contribution
is to allow for partial privatization. Indeed, the common feature of most of the
existing work on mixed oligopoly is to assume that the public ¯rms care only
about welfare. However in many countries, public ¯rms are partially privatized,
which implies they also care about pro¯t. A natural way to formalize this, is to
assume that the public ¯rm maximizes a (convex) combination of welfare and
pro¯t, and to represent the extent of privatization as the weight the public ¯rms
put on pro¯ts.
Di®erent approaches have been taken for modelling non-pro¯t behavior. In
Fershtman (1990), the reaction function is assumed to be a combination of
the purely pro¯t maximizing and the purely welfare maximizing reaction func-
tions. This is an assumption on endogeneous variable which is di®erent form
our assumption on the primitive that the objective function is a convex combi-
nation of pro¯t and welfare.1 Fershtman (1990) is also interested by di®erent
issues which are relative pro¯t-performance, and entry deterrence. In particu-
lar, he shows that non-pro¯t maximizing ¯rms make more pro¯t than pro¯t-
maximizing ¯rms and that non-pro¯t maximizing ¯rms can reduce entry on the
market. There is also some related work on strategic delegation by ¯rm own-
ers. Fershtman and Judd (1987) who study how the owners can strategically
manipulate the incentive schemes of their managers to a®ect the oligopoly out-
1See Bos and Peters (1989) for a detailed analysis of the objective function of a partly
privatized ¯rmcome. They show that there may be value to the owners of distorting their
managers' incentive away from pro¯t maximization, even though the owners
care only about pro¯ts. In a two stage Cournot game where the owners ¯rst set
the incentives for their managers and the managers then compete in quantities,
the equilibrium involves twisting the managers away from pro¯t maximization
by providing incentives for sales (over-compensation). The reason is that max-
imizing sales revenue instead of pro¯t makes the seller a more agressive com-
petitor which changes the equilibrium outcome in the Cournot-quantity game,
since each manager will react to the incentives given to competing managers.
The distortion from pro¯t maximization is reversed when managers compete in
price. To encourage managers to set a high price, owners will pay managers to
keep sales low (under-compensation). Sklivas (1987) shows that delegation is
always a dominant strategy but that in equilibrium with delegation and optimal
managerial incentives, pro¯ts can be either increased or decreased, relative to
no delegation, depending on whether ¯rms compete in prices or quantities. This
is because the simultaneous delegation involves incentive contracts with sales
premium in the Cournot game which strenghtens competition and lowers ¯rm
pro¯ts. In the same vein, Brander and Lewis (1986) show that a ¯rm's owners
may strategically manipulate the capital structure to alter their incentives and
competitors' behavior. By issuing extra debt, the possibility of bankruptcy leads
the manager to act more agressively. In the Cournot competition equilibrium
all ¯rms are worse o®, even though it is a dominant strategy for each of them
to strategically issue extra debt. Showalter (1995) shows that in a Bertrand
competition equilibrium ¯rms are better o® with this strategy so that we can
predict debt levels to be associated with higher pro¯ts as evidence suggests.
Our modelling of partial privatization is closely related to Matsumura (1998)
who shows that either pure welfare maximization or pure pro¯t maximation by
the public ¯rm are harmful in a mixed Cournot duopoly with homogeneous
goods. This result relies on the assumption that private ¯rms remain active
in equilibrium (as in Cremer et al., 1989). Our purpose is to explicitly allow
the public ¯rm to price out the market the private ¯rms, and to determine the
optimal degree of privatization as a function of the cost advantage of the private
¯rms.
The second contribution of this paper is to allow for di®erentiated markets.
Most of the existing work on mixed oligopoly and strategic delegation assumes
all ¯rms sell an homogenous product.2 We relax this assumption and consider
a mixed duopoly in a symetrically di®erentiated market µ a la Shubik. We then
compare privatization under price and quantity competition when goods are
either complements or substitutes.3 Our main result is a duality result of partial
2The few exceptions are Cremer et al (1991) on mixed oligopoly and Fershtman and Judd
(1985) on strategic delegation.
3Cremeretal (1991) isratherdi®erentand moreambitious. They use aspatial competition
model ofproduct di®erentiation µ ala Hotelling to study the jointe®ectofa public ¯rmon price
competition and product selection (location choices). Demand is inelastic and total welfare
is equal to total transportation costs. In the case of a duopoly, one public ¯rm is bene¯cial
for welfare (it induces the e±cient locational con¯guration). Howeverin a triopoly, the public
3privatization. Partial privatization is optimal with Cournot competition when
the goods are substitutes and, it is optimal with Bertrand competition when the
goods are complements. We also show that full privatization is never optimal
no matter what the type of competition is and whether goods are substitutes
or complements.
Turning to the tax incidence, some mixed oligopoly models investigate the
e®ect of taxes and subsidies on such markets. The main result is that the ¯rst-
best can be restored with optimal subsidies that are independent of ownership
structure and whether the game is simultaneous or the public ¯rm is a Stackel-
berg leader. This tax non-discrimination result has been obtained for a mixed
oligopoly with one public ¯rm concerned only with welfare and n private ¯rms
producing an homogeneous good.4 Our purpose is to extend this tax analysis of
mixed markets to the more general setting where public ¯rms care both about
pro¯t and welfare. It is shown that the optimal taxes are independent of the
weights the public ¯rms put on welfare and pro¯t. This is shown to be true
for general cost functions (with possibly di®erent costs between public and pri-
vate ¯rms), homogeneous or di®erentiated goods and Cournot or Stackelberg
competition.
The alternative to tax regulation mechanism is the marginal cost pricing
rule. Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) argue that marginal cost pricing is akin to
the public ¯rm acting as the Stackelberg follower.5 In a duopolistic industry
with one private and one public ¯rms, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) show that if
the public ¯rm is the Stackelberg leader, welfare is improved over the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium outcome. With public leadership, Harris and Wiens (1980)
argue that the ¯rst-best outcome could be achieved if the public ¯rm announces
that it will make up any di®erence between the e±cient output and the private
output. However such commitment is hardly credible since it can impose losses
on the public ¯rm for some private output levels.Reversing the leadership, Beato
and MasColell (1984) show that in many cases, the follower position of the public
¯rm implies marginal cost pricing and is welfare superior to the leader position.
The idea is that the equilibrium is characterized by a bias towards excessive
public production: price is larger than private marginal cost. It follows that
welfare increases if private production increases which is often the case when
the private ¯rm is the leader. To obtain this result, Beato and MasColell (1984)
assume a pure public ¯rm (with no pro¯t concern) and constant but di®erent
marginal cost between public and private ¯rms. We show that with identical
cost functions and pure public ¯rm, the welfare is the same under public or
private leadership. However private leadership is strictly better when the public
¯rm is also partly interested in pro¯t (partial privatization).
¯rm is harmful (it induces a more ine±cient locational con¯guration from the two private
¯rms: they locate too closely to the public ¯rm which is less agressive in pricing).
4The irrelevance result has ¯rst been obtained by White (1996) for speci¯c demand and
cost functionsand then extended to progressively more general cost and demand functions by
Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002).
5When the public ¯rms maximizes welfare, the marginal cost pricing rule is the public
reaction function to every private production. When the public ¯rm is a leader, its decision
rule assigns a constant public production to any private production.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The welfare analysis of priva-
tization is examined in Section 2 for homogeneous goods and in section 3 for
di®erentiated goods. The issue of optimal tax regulation is studied in Section 4.
Section 5 demonstrates the welfare superiority of price regulation over quantity
regulation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Privatization with Homogeneous Goods
2.1 Identical technology
We ¯rst consider the very simple setting of a public and private ¯rms producing
the same output with identical and constant marginal cost c > 0. Public pro-
duction is denoted x0 and private production is denoted x1. We assume linear
inverse demand P (X) = ® ¡ ¯X where X = x0 + x1 is the industry output,
® > c, and ¯ > 0. Given this simple environment we can explicitely calculate
the equilibrium outcome and make the welfare analysis of a change in ownership
structure. We will next verify the robustness of the result. The pro¯t levels are
¼0 = (® ¡ ¯x0 ¡ ¯x1)x0 ¡ cx0 (1)
¼1 = (® ¡ ¯x0 ¡ ¯x1)x1 ¡ cx1 (2)




P (y)dy ¡ c(x0 + x1) (3)
The objective of the public ¯rm is6
V = µW + (1 ¡ µ)¼0 (4)
The output levels solve the ¯rst-order conditions
@V
@x0
= ® ¡ (2 ¡ µ)¯x0 ¡ ¯x1 ¡ c = 0 (5)
@¼1
@x1
= ® ¡ ¯x0 ¡ 2¯x1 ¡ c = 0 (6)
The reactions functions are respectively
6In Fershtman (1990) the public ¯rmisassumed tohave a reaction function that isaconvex
combination of the reaction function of a welfare maximizing ¯rm and a pro¯t maximizing
¯rm. However it is easily seen in our model that maximizing a combination of welfare and



















(1¡ µ) (® ¡ c)
(3 ¡ 2µ)¯
(8)
So increasing µ increases the market share of the public ¯rm. This is because
the public ¯rm's concern for welfare serves as a credible commitment to increase
output beyond the pro¯t-maximizing level. Since public production is larger
than private production x0 > x1, it follows also that the public ¯rm is more
pro¯table than the private ¯rm ¼0 > ¼1 although the public ¯rm is not a pro¯t
maximizer. The aggregate output is
X =
(2 ¡ µ)(® ¡ c)
(3 ¡ 2µ)¯
(9)
which is increasing in µ and so the equilibrium price is decreasing in µ.
Thus, the aggregate output is increasing with µ and equals the welfare max-
imizing output when µ = 1. This is because when the public ¯rm is concerned
only with welfare, it prices out of the market the private ¯rm (i.e. x1 = 0
for µ = 1) and acts as a monopolist maximizing welfare.7 Now consider the
case µ < 1. Let Á(µ) = (2 ¡ µ)=(3 ¡ 2µ) < 1 then the industry output is
X = Á(µ)(® ¡ c)=¯ which is less than the socially optimal level of output
X¤ = (® ¡ c)=¯ (solving the marginal cost pricing rule P (X) = c). The level of
welfare is increasing in µ and so privatization cannot be optimal.
The natural question in such analysis is whether the capacity of the public
¯rm to restore the ¯rst-best is not speci¯c to the duopolistic model. Consider
for example that the public ¯rm competes with n ¸ 2 identical private ¯rms.
Calculating the equilibrium quantities in this mixed oligopoly gives
x0 =
(® ¡ c)
((2 ¡ µ) + (1 ¡ µ)n)¯
(10)
nx1 =
(1 ¡ µ)(® ¡ c)n
((2 ¡ µ) + (1 ¡ µ)n)¯
(11)
7We ignore capacity constraint.
6Thus again the private ¯rms are all priced out the market by the single public
¯rm when µ = 1 (i.e. nx1 = 0) and the ¯rst-best is restored. It is also immediate
to see that the welfare is an increasing function of µ. It is enough to have a single
¯rm which cares only about welfare to restore the socially optimal outcome in
this oligopoly industry. The advantage of this solution is that it does not require
information about cost and demand functions (such as price regulation would
require). The bottom line is that privatization is unambiguously bad for welfare
in a symmetric and non-di®erentiated industry.
Of course this story is incomplete: if we allow for increasing marginal costs
then the opposite result that social welfare is increased when the public ¯rm
maximizes pro¯t may hold. That point was ¯rst made by De Fraja and Del-
bono (1989). They provide a numerical example showing that, in some cir-
cumstances and when ¯rms have an identical technology exhibiting increasing
marginal costs, social welfare can be increased by instructing the public ¯rm to
maximize its own pro¯t. That result has a paradoxical °avour. Nevertheless, it
¯nds a clear explanation in the countervailing e®ects of privatization. Privatiza-
tion in an oligopolistic market reduces allocative e±ciency: it creates oligopoly
rents and, consequently, results in lower output and higher prices. However, un-
der reasonable circumstances, privatization also enhances productive e±ciency
even with identical technologies. Indeed, if ¯rms face identical and increasing
marginal costs, productive e±ciency requires that production be equally split
among them. But, in a mixed oligopoly, there is excessive public production
and so the public ¯rm operates at higher marginal cost than the private ¯rms.
Therefore, privatization is optimal whenever the gains in terms of productive ef-
¯ciency outweight the losses in terms of allocative e±ciency. Moreover, the more
competitive the market { the larger the number of competitors { the more likely
are the productive gains from privatization to dominate its allocative e±ciency
costs.
In this paper, we believe that the binary choice between either no privati-
zation or full privatization is a bit extreme. It is also counterfactual. We allow
instead for the possibility of partial privatization which is likely to dominate
either the full privatization or no privatization solutions. In fact, we now ex-
tend the welfare analysis to allow for cost asymmetries in order to show that
when ¯rms operate di®erent technologies: (a) no privatization cannot be op-
timal when the public ¯rm su®ers a cost-disadvantage relative to its private
competitors and(b) cost asymetries have to be excessively high to make full
privatization optimal.
2.2 Di®erent technology
If ¯rms have unequal production cost such that the private ¯rm is more e±cient,
then the overall welfare e®ect of privatization consists of two con°icting e®ects:
the cost of reducing industry output and the gain from shifting production to
more e±cient private ¯rms. Using the linear duopoly model discussed previ-
ously we can evaluate the optimal degree of privatization. Let c be the constant
marginal cost of the private ¯rm, and consider that the public ¯rm is less e±-
7cient with a constant marginal cost of (1+ ¹)c where ¹ ¸ 0 is the cost markup
of public ¯rm. Calculating reaction functions in the linear duopolistic industry
gives
x0 =
® ¡ (1 + ¹)c ¡ ¯x1
(2 ¡ µ)¯
x1 =
® ¡ c¡ ¯x0
2¯
Solving to get equilibrium quantities
x0 =
® ¡ c ¡ 2¹c
(3 ¡ 2µ)¯
x1 =
(1 ¡ µ)(® ¡ c) + ¹c
(3 ¡ 2µ)¯
Thus removing any pro¯t maximizing concern from the public ¯rm does not
price out the private ¯rm: x1 = ¹c=¯ for µ = 1. Plugging the equilibrium
outcome into the welfare function




2 ¡ c(x0 + x1) ¡ ¹cx0
= ®
µ


















® ¡ c¡ 2¹c
(3 ¡ 2µ)¯
¶
Calculating the welfare maximizing level of µ yields
µ
¤ =
® ¡ (1 + 5¹)c
® ¡ (1 + 4¹)c
2 [0;1]
Not surprisingly partial privatization is always good for welfare and the optimal
degree of privatization increases with the relative e±ciency of private ¯rms.
However this relative e±ciency has to be excessively high to make complete
privatization optimal: in fact µ
¤ = 0 when ¹ ¸ (® ¡ c)=5c, (see Matsumura,
1998, for similar result).
3 Privatization with Di®erentiated Goods
We now introduce a taste for variety, so that the trade o® involved with priva-
tization is between the cost of lower industry output and the gain arising from
greater variety (think of our previous case where the public production crowds
out the private production). We will see how the conclusion about the optimal
8privatization depends on wheher goods are susbtitutes or complements, and on
whether ¯rms compete in prices or quantities.
We consider a di®erentiated products duopoly with constant marginal cost
normalized to zero c = 0. Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984),
we assume that the representative consumer's preferences are described by the
following quadratic utility function











yielding the following (direct and inverse) demand systems:
pi = ® ¡ ¯xi ¡ ±xj; i 6= j: (13)
xi = a ¡ bpi + dpj; i 6= j; (14)
We assume that ® > 0, ¯ > 0 and ¯ > ±. These assumptions ensure that U is
strictly concave. The parameters of the inverse demand (13) are related to the













For positive, zero or negative ± values, the goods are respectively substitutes,
independent or complements. Let ° = ±=¯ denote the degree of product di®er-
entiation varying from 0 for independent goods to 1 for perfect substitutes or
complements. Furthermore the assumption of ¯ > ± implies that the own-price
e®ect dominates the cross-price e®ect.
We consider two di®erent forms of competition: Under Cournot-Nash com-
petition, players choose output levels as strategies and in a Bertrand-Nash game,
they choose prices as strategies. In both cases, the timing of the game is as fol-
lows: in the ¯rst stage, the social planner decides on the degree of privatization
µ. In the second stage, both ¯rms compete on the market. We look for the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the proposed game.
Our analysis takes advantage of the formal duality that relates Cournot's
and Bertrand's models of oligopoly.8 Duality follows straightforwardly from the
following observations. First, expressions of private ¯rms' pro¯ts under quantity
and price competition are respectively given by
¼i(xi;xj) = (® ¡ ¯xi ¡ ±xj)xi; 8i;j 2 f0;1g (16)
and
¼i(pi;pj) = (a ¡ bpi + dpj)pi; 8i;j 2 f0;1g: (17)
8That duality was ¯rst noticed by Sonnenschein (1968) in a non-di®erentiated market. He
observed that complementary monopoly equilibrium outcome can be obtained from Cournot
equilibrium outcome by merely changing variables, and conversely. This observation was
subsequently extended to di®erentiated products markets by Singh and Vives (1984). In this
case, Cournot (Bertrand) competition with substitutes (± > 0) was shown to be the dual of
Bertrand (Cournot) competition with complements (± < 0).
9It can be noticed that we can obtain one expression from the other by identifying
xi with pi, ® with a and ± with ¡d.
Second, the public ¯rm's objective function under quantity and price com-
petition can be rewritten so as to exibit a similar symmetry. Note that social
welfare, when considered as a function of quantities, can be written in the fol-
lowing form











where ¹ = ® and ³ = 0. Now, let us express social welfare as a function of
prices. Plugging the direct demand functions x0(p0;p1) and x1(p0;p1) into (18)
and rearranging, we get,











where ´ = 0 and » = ®2=(¯ + ±). Therefore, objective functions of the partially
privatized ¯rm under Cournot and Bertrand competition can be respectively
written as follows:
^ V (x0;x1) = µ
·













+ (1¡ µ) [(® ¡ ¯x0 ¡ ±x1)x0]; (21)
^ V(p0;p1) = µ
·













+ (1 ¡ µ)[(a ¡ bp0 + dp1)p0]: (23)
Thus quantity optimization problem is the dual of the price optimization prob-
lem given the permutation of parameters.
In the quantity competition model, the private ¯rm maximizes ¼i(xi;xj) and
the public ¯rm maximizes ^ V(x0;x1) whereas, in the price competition model,
the private ¯rm maximizes ¼i(pi;pj) and the public ¯rm maximizes ^ V(p0;p1).
In what follows, we will exploit this duality between the two games.
3.1 Quantity Competition
We now solve for quantity competition. The private ¯rm takes x0 as given and
chooses x1 so as to maximize ¼1(x1;x0) whereas the public ¯rm takes x1 as
given and chooses x0 so as to maximize ^ V (x0;x1). The ¯rst-order conditions
(@¼1=@x1 = 0 and @ ^ V=@x0 = 0) yield the following reaction functions :
x0 = r0(x1) =
® ¡ µ(® ¡ ¹) ¡ ±x1
(2 ¡ µ)¯
; (24a)


















and replacing ¹ = ® in equilibrium quantities, we obtain:
xc
0 =
® (2¯ ¡ ±)
2(2¡ µ)¯2 ¡ ±2 ; xc
1 =
® ((2 ¡ µ)¯ ¡ ±)
2(2 ¡ µ)¯2 ¡ ±2 :







2 > 0; (27)









1) < 0: (28)
The public ¯rm produces more and prices less in equilibrium than the private






























1 > 0, the public ¯rm makes more pro¯t than its private competitor
if and only if ¯(xc
0 + xc
1) · ® which reduces to




As one can easily see, this might be true only if the goods are substitutes (± >
0), otherwise the private ¯rm makes more pro¯t when goods are complements
(± < 0).
We now solve for the optimal degree of privatization. Plugging equilibrium











Therefore partial privatization is optimal (µ
¤
c < 1) only if goods are substitutes
± > 0:
113.2 Price competition
It is usual that a change in the strategic variable may reverse the result (see
Fershtman and Judd, 1987). So we check the welfare e®ect of privatization if
¯rms sell di®erentiated products and compete in price. In this case, the private
¯rm takes p0 as given and chooses p1 so as to maximize ¼1(p1;p0) whereas
the public ¯rm takes p1 as given and chooses p0 so as to maximize ^ V(p0;p1).
Reaction functions can be derived by direct application of the duality principle.
Bertrand's reaction functions can be obtained from Cournot's reaction functions
(24a) and (24b) by identifying x0 with p0, ® with a, ± with ¡d, ¯ with b and ¹
with ´. It comes that
p0 = r0(p1) =
a ¡ µ(a ¡ ´) + dp1
(2 ¡ µ)b
; (31)




Applying the duality principle we can also get the Bertrand equilibrium from




a(2(1 ¡ µ)b+ d) + 2´µb




a((2 ¡ µ)b + (1 ¡ µ)d) + ´µd
2(2 ¡ µ)b2 ¡ d2 (34)
Since ´ = 0 , we obtain
pb
0 =
a(2(1 ¡ µ)b + d)
2(2¡ µ)b2 ¡ d2 ; pb
1 =
a((2¡ µ)b + (1¡ µ)d)
2(2 ¡ µ)b2 ¡ d2 (35)







2(2 ¡ µ)b2 ¡ d2 < 0; (36)
and from (14) the equilibrium quantity di®erence is
xb
0 ¡ xb
1 = ¡(b+ d)(pb
0 ¡ pb
1) > 0 (37)
Thus the public ¯rm produces more and and prices less in equilibrium than the






































1 < 0 the public ¯rm makes higher pro¯t if and only if b(pb
1+pb
0) ¸ a








12This inequality can only hold if goods are substitutes ± > 0; otherwise private
¯rm makes more pro¯t in equilibrium. Comparing public ¯rm performance with
quantity competition we get the following result.
Proposition 1 In a symmetrically di®erentiated market with quantity compe-
tition, the public ¯rm always makes less pro¯t than the private ¯rm when goods
are complements. When goods are substitutes there exist thresholds on the public
¯rm concern for welfare 0 < µc < µb < 1 such that the public ¯rm makes higher
pro¯t:
(i) under quantity competition, if and only if µ < µc
(ii) under price competition, if and only if µ < µb










b = argmaxf ^ W(pb
0; pb
1)g can be obtained from µ
¤
c = argmaxf ^ W(xc
0; xc
1)g
by merely changing ± by ¡d and ¯ by b in (30). Then using (15), the optimal
extent of privatization in the Bertrand case is given by
µ
¤




Comparing this result with the optimal extent of privatization under quantity
competition we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider a symmetrically di®erentiated market. Then full pri-
vatization (µ = 0) is never optimal. Furthermore, partial privatization is optimal
(i) under quantity competition, if and only if the goods are substitutes;
(ii) under price competition, if and only if the goods are complements.
The main intuition is the following. Public ¯rm cares about welfare and so
produces more and prices less in equilibrium irrespective of whether ¯rms com-
petes in prices or quantities. Now suppose goods are (imperfect) substitutes.
Under quantity competition privatization leads the public ¯rm to produce less
and because there is strategic substitutability in quantities it will lead the pri-
vate ¯rm to produce more. Without privatization, the public ¯rm produces so
as to maximize welfare and the private ¯rm under produce (strategic substi-
tutability) with a price in excess of marginal cost. Given this excessive public
production, reducing public production has only a second-order e®ect on welfare
while the induced increase in private production has a ¯rst-order e®ect. Hence,
welfare is improved with partial privatization. However under price competition,
privatization leads the public ¯rm to price more and because there is strategic
complementarity in prices, the private ¯rm will also price more so that, overall,
privatization is harmful with lower supply and higher prices.
4 Non-Discrimination in Taxes
In this section we show that optimal tax regulation should not discriminate
between private and public ¯rms. In fact optimal taxes are independent of the
13public ¯rm's concern for welfare, even though such a concern brings the equi-
librium closer to the socially optimal outcome.We make this point ¯rst with
identical technology between public and private ¯rms, then with di®erent tech-
nologies and lastly with sequential move between private and public ¯rms.
4.1 Equal cost
The general case assumes decreasing inverse demand P(x) and increasing convex
cost C(x). Identical cost functions is still assumed (we relax this assumption
later). It follows that total cost in the industry is minimized when all ¯rms have
equal market shares (so as to equate marginal costs). So it cannot be socially
optimal to have the public ¯rm producing more than the private in equilibrium.
Intuition would suggest that public and private ¯rms should therefore be taxed
di®erently because they have di®erent incentive to produce. We now show that
it is mistaken.




P (x) dx ¡ C (x0) ¡ C(x1) (40)




P (x) dx ¡ C (x0) ¡ C(x1)
#
+ (1¡ µ) [P (X)x0 ¡ C(x0) ¡ tx0]
(41)
The output levels solve the ¯rst-order conditions
@V
@x0
= µ [P(X) ¡ C0(x0)]+ (1¡ µ) [P (X) ¡ C 0(x0) ¡ t+ x0P 0] = 0
For ¯rm 1
¼1 = P(X)x1 ¡ C(x1) ¡ tx1 (42)
@¼1
@x1
´ P(X) ¡ C0(x1) ¡ t + x1P 0 = 0 (43)





P (y)dy ¡ C (x0) ¡ C(x1) (44)
The two necessary conditions for this are
P ¡ C0(x0) = 0 (45)
P ¡ C0(x1) = 0 (46)
14Subtract the ¯rst from the second to give
C0(x0) = C 0(x1) (47)





so price is equal to marginal cost. To decentralize this e±cient outcome, we
must satisfy the two ¯rst-order conditions for the ¯rms that reduce to
¡t + x0P 0 = 0 (49)








which remains independent of µ: Thus the same tax rates decentralize the so-
cially optimal outcome in a mixed oligopoly irrespective of the weight the public
¯rm put on social welfare.
How far can we generalize this independence result? we consider in turn (i)
di®erent cost functions and (ii) stackelberg leadership.
4.2 Di®erent costs
The neutrality result is readily extended to di®erent cost functions. Let Ci(xi)
be the (convex and increasing) cost function of ¯rm i = 0;1: So the public ¯rm
can be either more or less performant than the private ¯rm. In this case, the
socially optimal solution again requires two things (i) equating marginal costs;
(ii) price equal to marginal cost. So the ¯rst-best solution is characterized by a
pair (¸









To decentralize this optimal outcome, we must satisfy the two ¯rst-order con-
ditions for the ¯rms that, given marginal cost pricing, reduce to
¡t0 + x0P 0 (X¤) = 0 (54)
¡t1 + x1P 0 (X¤) = 0 (55)
where x0 = ¸
¤X¤ and x1 = (1¡ ¸
¤)X¤which yields
t0 = ¸
¤X¤P 0 (X¤) (56)
t1 = (1¡ ¸
¤)X¤P 0 (X¤) (57)
which is determined entirely by the inverse demand and cost functions and so
it remains independent of µ:
154.3 Stackelberg
Suppose public leadership. The optimization problem of the public ¯rm takes
into account the response function of the private ¯rm. The best response func-
tion x1 = r1(x0) is implicitely de¯ned by the ¯rst-order condition of ¯rm 1
@¼1
@x1
´ P(X) ¡ C0(x1) ¡ t1 + x1P 0(X) = 0






Hence the ¯rst-order condition of the public leader is
@V
@x0
= µ [P(X) ¡ C0(x0)]+ (1¡ µ) [P (X) ¡ C 0(x0) ¡ t0 + x0P 0]








The optimal tax must induce the ¯rst-best of P(X) = C 0(x0) = C 0(x1) and






)x0P 0(X) = 0
which evaluated at the ¯rst-best outcome X¤ = x¤
0 + x¤














Since the optimal allocation (x¤
0;x¤
1) is determined entirely by the demand and
cost functions, and the reaction function dx1=dx0 is ¯xed at the optimal out-
come, the optimal taxes are again independent of µ:
5 Price versus Quantity Regulation
The Nash solution is the outcome where the private ¯rm maximizes pro¯t given
public prodution and the public ¯rm maximizes welfare given private produc-
tion. The resulting outcome is characterized by excessive public production. It
would therefore be better in terms of welfare, to depart from this decision rule
for the public ¯rm and to adjust public production downwards in order to in-
duce a favorable increase in private production. The issue is whether the public
¯rm should then act as the leader or the follower. This question is important for
16market regulation because public follower is akin to price regulation since the
marginal cost pricing rule is the public reaction function to every private pro-
duction. When the public ¯rm is a leader, it is equivalent to quantity regulation
since its decision rule assigns a ¯xed public production to private production
choice. Using the linear model in Section 2 with homogeneous goods, we can
explicitely solve the stackelberg model when either the public or the private
¯rm is the leader. In the linear model the socially optimal aggregate supply is
X¤ = (® ¡ c)=¯.
5.1 Quantity Regulation
























where X¤ = (® ¡ c) =¯ is the socially optimal industry output. Note that equi-
librium outcome converges to the ¯rst-best when µ = 1:
5.2 Price Regulation




































































It is easily seen that this inequality is strictly satis¯ed for all 0 < µ < 1 and
weakly satis¯ed for µ = f0;1g. Hence in a mixed oligopoly it is better to have
the private ¯rm acting as the leader: it leads to higher output and lower price.
The order of moves does not matter when the public ¯rm is concerned only
either with pro¯t (µ = 0) or with welfare (µ = 1).
Proposition 3 If the public and private ¯rms produce homogeneous goods with
the same constant marginal cost and no capacity limit,
(i) welfare is the same with quantity and price regulation when the public
¯rm has no pro¯t concern (no privatization).
(ii) price regulation dominates when the public ¯rm also cares about pro¯t
(partial privatization)
This shows that the independence result relative to the roles of the two ¯rms
in Myles (2002), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and White (1996) is restricted to the
speci¯c case where the public ¯rm is concerned only with welfare (part i of the
Proposition). The superiority of private leadership comes from the bias in mixed
markets towards excessive public production. Departing from the marginal cost
pricing rule by cutting public production induces favorable increase in private
production. This is possible by allowing public ¯rms to care also about pro¯t
(partial privatization). Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) get similar dominance of
price regulation with pure public ¯rm by assuming di®erent cost functions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have been interested to look at the interaction between the form
of delegation and the competition on di®erentiated markets. Since Schelling
(1960) economists know that delegation can be used as a commitment device.
By delegating decisions to agents with di®erent preferences from one's own,
one can make threats credible that were not invividually rational to carry out
if oneself would act. Some authors have incorporated this argument into an
industrial organization context where ¯rm owners can delegate decision to a
manager and alter her incentive contract to make her act more agressively (see
e.g. Vickers(1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershmant and Judd (1987) and Sklivas
(1987)). They have shown that it can be a dominant strategy for ¯rm owners to
delegate production and price decisions to a manager and to distort managerial
incentive away from pro¯t maximization by o®ering either negative (with price
competition) or positive (with quantity competition) premium on sales.
18The analysis in this paper argues that, in a mixed and di®erentiated market
where public ¯rms compete with private ¯rms, privatization of the public ¯rm
by strategically delegating some of its decisions to a pro¯t-oriented manager can
be welfare improving in certain circumstances. We also show that such partial
privatization can sometimes lead the public ¯rm to make higher pro¯ts than
the private ¯rms. Turning to tax policy on mixed markets, we derive a non-
discrimination principle that optimal regulation involves taxing the same the
public ¯rms regardless of the extent of delegation of the public ¯rm to private
managers. Moreover public and private ¯rms should be taxed the same. Lastly
we ¯nd that price regulation is better than quantity regulation in terms of social
welfare.
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